Iran

Posted: Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Author: Justin Hefter

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has just passed its fourth round of Iran sanctions leading reporters and bloggers in the United States to debate the question: how effective will these new sanctions be in deterring Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons? The question they should be asking, however, is what do these new multilateral sanctions mean for the United States? For those paying attention to the debate on Capitol Hill, this new round of multilateral sanctions could provide the final impetus for passing tougher unilateral sanctions legislation.

Sanctions legislation has been on the books since the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). The ILSA delegates the State Department with the responsibility of determining whether companies’ activities are in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in May 2010, the State Department has failed to investigate and declare a company in violation of the Sanctions Act since 1998. Since then, the New York Times reports that the United States government has awarded over $107 billion in contracts to companies that do business in Iran. Why?

Posted: Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Author: Amna Ali

Serious speculations from the international community over Syria smuggling SCUD missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon led the State Department yesterday to summon a top Syrian diplomat for a talk. If the weapon allegations are true, this could be a detrimental step backwards in the attempt to improve U.S. – Syrian diplomatic ties and could also weaken the Middle East peace process. Syria’s president, Bashar Assad , embraced reality when he stated, “I will be happy to discuss peace with him [President Obama], but there is the influence of the lobbyists and other players.” When discussing the U.S. and Syria, it is impossible to view the bilateral relationship as not being always heavily influenced by considerations of Iran and Israel.

Since the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and the withdrawal of the U.S. ambassador from Damascus, the U.S’s relationship with Syria has been deeply strained. While recent attempts have been made to appoint a new U.S. ambassador, the Senate has not approved the nomination of Robert Ford, and SCUD missile allegations will surely slow the process down even further. Additionally, while Obama’s administration is motivated to strengthen ties with Syria in hopes of weakening its relationship with Iran, there is belief that the possible transfer of weapons into Lebanon is Syria’s way of demonstrating the strength of its ties with Iran.

Posted: Friday, February 12, 2010
Author: Dan Lawner

President Obama seems hard-pressed, these days, to get a win. In his foreign policy, his desire to press the restart button with the world and focus on engagement and multilateralism may have created warm fuzzies, but relatively little in the way of results. On Tuesday, Iran ‘s announcement that it would proceed in autonomously enriching Uranium will test the Obama administration to (a) effectively switch from an engagement track to a confrontation track and (b), to cash in on its talk of multilateralism to coordinate targeted sanctions against Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

As of now, China remains the main obstacle to passing a Security Council resolution, as administration officials now believe “that they would have the support of Russia” in a referendum on sanctions. China’s long-standing reluctance to meddle in the affairs of nations with whom they have significant trading or strategic relationships, coupled with a rocky patch in Sino-U.S. relations makes them an especially tough party to convince in support of sanctions. But a Reuters Analysis from yesterday suggests China’s willingness to consider sanctions if (and this is a big “if”) their business and energy relationships with the Revolutionary Guard are protected.

Posted: Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Author: Elise Hogan

Following orders from President Ahmadinejad, Iran announced plans today to ramp up its nuclear capacity in an open letter to UN watchdog group, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Earlier this year, the IAEA attempted to facilitate Iran’s acquisition of 20% enriched uranium through a deal to trade externally enriched uranium from France or Argentina for Iran’s remaining low-enriched uranium (LEU), but Tehran missed the IAEA’s deadline.

The new plan to autonomously produce high-enriched uranium (HEU) is a bold rejection of the IAEA’s proposed deal and has the US and its allies calling for increased UN sanctions to prevent Iran from developing weapon-grade materials. The 20% enrichment will allow Iran to fuel reactors such as the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which can produce the medical isotopes that Ahmadinejad deems necessary for the people of Iran.

How much LEU and HEU does Iran possess? How much are they capable of producing going forward and how quickly? Does Iran have the capacity to accumulate enough weapons-grade HEU to build a nuclear weapon?

Posted: Monday, November 2, 2009
Author: Melanie Dominski

Iran claims that the Nabucco pipeline, a project meant to diversify Europe’s natural gas suppliers away from Russia, will not be effective without the export of Iranian gas to the pipeline. Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves after Russia, and is considered by many experts to be the most economical gas route to Europe. However, due to US opposition and trade sanctions on Iran related to their nuclear program, Iran has been blocked from involvement in the Nabucco pipeline project.

Posted: Friday, August 14, 2009
Author: Andrew Akhlaghi

The initial narrative of the Iranian elections has changed significantly. At first, it seemed that the elections were really a contest between two rival camps of political elites. The elections seemed to pit Mousavi, backed by Rafsanjani’s money and connections, against Ahmadinejad, backed by Khameini’s money and connections. The electoral violence and street protests initially seemed to show these two factions continuing to vie against each other for power. It appeared that Ahmadinejad and Khameini were working in tandem to steal the election and Mousavi and Rafsanjani were leading the opposition. This narrative has been complicated by the gradual internal drift that both these pairs have experienced.

Posted: Monday, August 3, 2009
Author: Steven Rotchtin

As it becomes clearer that Iran is, under present conditions, uninterested in engaging President Obama in bilateral discussions over its nuclear program, the New York Times reports that elements within the American administration have begun to explore the possibility of imposing more substantial sanctions against Iran. The most popular option at the moment is cutting off the regime’s imports of refined petroleum, a sanction that, if carried out successfully, would have an enormous effect on the energy- starved Iranian economy.

Posted: Friday, July 24, 2009
Author: Andrew Akhlaghi

Last week I wrote an entry on why Iran will most likely not be supplier for the Nabucco. The case is interesting as it reveals an interesting twist in how political and economic priorities interact with energy policy. The reason Iran will most likely not be a supplier for Nabucco is not just its poor human rights record and potential pursuit of nuclear weapons; but has much more to do with Iran being a poor place to do business.

Posted: Thursday, July 16, 2009
Author: Andrew Akhlaghi

Ahmadinejad is trying to find a foreign policy issue to latch onto. Ahmadinejad has skillfully used international posturing to increase his public profile and stoke nationalist sentiment to quite internal opposition. He has tried to portray himself and Iran as the protectors of the Muslims. Specifically, he has championed the Palestinian cause by making outrageous and aggressive comments towards Israel and the West. Recently, Ahamdinejad has tried to portray the recent protest as a western plot to destabilize Iran. This is not necessarily working in his favor.

Posted: Friday, July 10, 2009
Author: Andrew Akhlaghi

Ahmadinejad’s Iran is increasingly on the defensive internationally and domestically. The recent protests on the anniversary of the 18th of Tir crackdown indicate that the opposition has been able to mobilize and organize protests. The few thousand now showing up to protest seems paltry in comparison to the crowds seen early in the election crisis; but organizing a protest in Tehran that resembles a military camp and where SMS, internet, and mobile service have been disrupted cannot be easy. In fact, Ahmadinejad and Khameini have more cards to play internationally than they do domestically.