Iran's Plans to Enrich: What They Mean and the Path Forward

Posted: Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Author: Elise Hogan

Following orders from President Ahmadinejad, Iran announced plans today to ramp up its nuclear capacity in an open letter to UN watchdog group, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Earlier this year, the IAEA attempted to facilitate Iran’s acquisition of 20% enriched uranium through a deal to trade externally enriched uranium from France or Argentina for Iran’s remaining low-enriched uranium (LEU), but Tehran missed the IAEA’s deadline.

The new plan to autonomously produce high-enriched uranium (HEU) is a bold rejection of the IAEA’s proposed deal and has the US and its allies calling for increased UN sanctions to prevent Iran from developing weapon-grade materials. The 20% enrichment will allow Iran to fuel reactors such as the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which can produce the medical isotopes that Ahmadinejad deems necessary for the people of Iran.

How much LEU and HEU does Iran possess? How much are they capable of producing going forward and how quickly? Does Iran have the capacity to accumulate enough weapons-grade HEU to build a nuclear weapon?

For a detailed report on Iran’s capacity to produce weapons-grade Uranium, check the Institute for Science and International Security(ISS)'s TRR Technical Note.

ISIS also reported today on the proliferation implications of Iran self-producing fuel for the TRR. The report was a follow-up to their analysis of Iran’s new plans confirming that Iran has the capacity to produce 20% enriched uranium.

So what should U.S. policymakers do to counter the potential threat posed by a nuclear Iran? There are many conflicting voices ranging from airstrikes to inaction (based on the potential benefitsto the United States if Iran were to build a bomb). Most reasoned voices find both of these tacks extreme and silly , in favor of some combination of Economic sanctions and political pressure. In that vein, the administration is frantically trying to coordinate sanctions in “weeks not months”.

Weighing potential courses of action in response to Iran is undoubtedly a multi-faceted and high-risk issue. Reaching an understanding of Iran’s intent behind its nuclear enrichment plans is key to deciding the next step, but the administration does not have the same luxury of time that characterized the Afghanistan war strategy review. Because the only thing that we can know for sure about Iran’s intent (and was confirmed today) is that it is not to delay.