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Al Shabab and Al Qa'ida: An Unsurprising Marriage Signals a Troubling Trend


Posted: Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Authors: Dan Lawner and Sarah Catanzaro

The Somali Islamist militant group Al Shabab announced on Monday that intended to adopt Al Qa'ida's global jihadist agenda. According to the Wall Street Journal, Al Shabab’s statement, issued in Somali and Arabic, is the group’s first official proclamation of their alignment with Al Qa’ida, expressed their intention to “connect the horn of Africa jihad to the one led by Al Qa'ida and its leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden." This development is an indication of a troubling trend whereby Al Qa’ida is acting more and more like a multi-national corporation—with an attractive brand image and capable subsidiaries.

At first glance, the news of Al Shabab and Al Qa'ida joining forces was not a remarkable development. Al Shabab strictly practices and implements Sharia law and is eager to expand their operational base. Thus, Al Qa'ida is a natural ally because they can offer Al Shabab both resources and expertise. From a strategic perspective the partnership is logical and predictable. However, when one considers the objectives of each group, a formal merger appears less appropriate. Al Shabab’s purported aims—establishing an Islamic state in Somalia—are domestic in nature. Conversely, Al Qa'ida's designs are pan-Islamic. Thus, the official alignment between these organizations reveals something about the appeal of international terrorist network and the ability of Al Qa'ida to coopt local jihadist groups.

No terrorist group, including Al Qa’ida can be self-sustaining. Thus, all must engage in expansionary business practices to become more robust and to furnish protection from outside threats. In the past, Al Qa’ida has allowed other groups to use its facilities, equipment, or personnel for a specific purpose and duration and has also financed terrorist groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activity. However, as Al Shabab’s declaration proves, Al Qa’ida is now more formally merging with other groups and utilizing their recruits as agents to perpetuate its global jihadist program. By officially merging, Al Qa’ida and its affiliates can consolidate their assets so that they can better survive in a risky environment. Because of this relationship, Al Qa'ida has evolved into an entity similar to a franchiser, that allows local jihadist groups to market its brand in their territory.

Though Al Shabab’s alliance with Al Qa’ida is not shocking in itself, we should be weary that Al Qa’ida’s expansion looking more and more like a Harvard Business School case study. (We have a hunch there might be a business school case study out there already on Al Qai’da. Let us know if you know of one.)