Clemency May Beat Bullets in Fighting Taliban: The New Reintegration Strategy

Posted: Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Author: Andrew Baer

Britain and Japan have agreed to assume leadership over an international fund program designed to reintegrate Taliban fighters back into Afghan civil society. The fund will dispense over 500 million dollars in the next 5 years to support a broader plan calibrated to woo the Taliban through job opportunities, clemency, and retaliation protection.

The program, which is to be formally announced Thursday at a conference on Afghanistan in London, meshes with changing international leadership opinion on effective counter-insurgency strategy. Last year President Obama highlighted reintegration strategy in his West Point address as a key component in the Afghan theatre. General Stanley McChrystal likewise supports the reintegration of low-level Taliban fights while informing his commanders to identify and address the socioeconomic causes which spurn insurgency recruitment. President Karzai and Afghan officials have also outlined numerous proposals centered on convalescence.

In 2009, Nigerian President Yar’adua initiated a similar reintegration ordinance to hound rebel activity in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian program consisted of clemency, employment, stipends, and higher education opportunity, most being similar attributes to the Afghan program. Within days of enacting the program, several thousand militants laid down their arms and began the reintegration process. Saudi Arabia initiated clemency and rehabilitation programs several years ago to counter Al-Qaeda influence on the peninsula. These programs have sought to open up dialogue concerning the illegitimacy of terrorism according to Islam, curtail radical influence on youth, and, again, provide job assistance, stipends, and clemency. Consequently, the Saudi government has made headway in reducing the threat of terrorism. Following suit in Afghanistan may yield progress in the conflict.

Despite the unveiling of reintegration strategy and coalition attempts to negotiate with the Taliban, many within the Taliban leadership refuse to discuss or address points of compromise. On the other hand, Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid indicates that some camps within the Taliban network, such as those under Mullah Mohammad Omar, have shown interest in reintegration proposals through various secret talks orchestrated by Saudi and Pakistani officials at Karzai’s bidding. Rashid also argues for Pakistani cooperation in mediating reintegration talks as the ISI, Pakistan’s central Inter-Services Intelligence agency, maintains communicable relations with the Taliban. The ISI, Rashid continues, regards the Taliban as a trump card against Indian supremacy and influence in the region, a pragmatic concern for Pakistan.

If the international fund program under British and Japanese leadership is able to produce the results Nigeria managed in its own reintegration strategy, the potential for progress may flare. Considering that a majority of low level fighters likely enlist with the Taliban for economic rather than ideological reasons, reintegration programs catering toward socioeconomic grievances may add the weight necessary in crippling Taliban power.