Prospects for Successful Engagement

Posted: Thursday, July 2, 2009
Author: Steven Rotchtin

As the energy of the opposition in Iran appears to dwindle, it seems that the Obama administration has arrived at three conclusions from this past month’s events: that its fundamental interests in Iran have not been changed, that engagement is still the preferable policy, and that they will be dealing with a regime firmly controlled by Iran’s militant conservatives. In light of these assertions, the administration must be asking itself how this month’s events have affected the probability of a positive Iranian response to US efforts at engagement.

The answer to this question depends on the utility the Iranian regime sees in using foreign policy to secure its position domestically. The mass protests and energetic opposition of the last few weeks has undoubtedly convinced the regime that its gravest threat comes from domestic forces, not from Israeli or American jets. From now on, Iran’s foreign policy will be viewed through the lens of the regime’s fragile internal position.

The probability of American engagement succeeding decreases dramatically if the Iranian regime decides that coercion is a more promising path to stability than is attempting to increase popular legitimacy. In this case, there is no use for reconciliation with the US and the Iranian regime will focus its attention on confronting its domestic opposition with the force of its network of loyal military, militia and police forces.

Conversely, the probability of success of American engagement rises if the regime assesses that increasing legitimacy is the most practical path to stability. If this judgment is made, then it is likely that the regime will attempt to use progress in negotiations with the US to bolster its internal legitimacy. This approach is appealing because it allows the regime to tack closer to the popular position of opposition candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who advocated a new tone in Iran’s foreign relations. Additionally, this path raises the prospect of a decrease in sanctions on the Iranian economy, which would help to diffuse popular outrage over Ahmadinejad’s gross mismanagement of the economy in his last term. Post-election comments and actions from the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad faction suggest that they, at least for now, have chosen the former course.

This does not bode well for Obama’s proposed strategy toward Iran.